This paper explores the resistance strategies of organisations to unwanted accounting-led changes. Its particular focus is with the external, deliberately 'public' forms of resistance rather than those which are more internal, 'private' forms. It is concerned with the way satellite organisations are created to provide a counter force to environmental disturbances such as accounting and finance-led changes. The specific empirical focus is general medical practice (GP practices) in the UK and New Zealand. GP practices in both countries have undergone considerable accounting-led change in the last few years and yet there has been similar reactions to these disturbances. The formation of Independent Practitioner Associations in New Zealand and commissioning organisations in the UK are comparable satellite bodies intended to control the worst effects of the original disturbances. To help analyse this empirical detail we draw insights from Habermas' model of society, organisational change theory and institutional theory. In the process the paper not only amplifies the empirical reactions of GP practices in New Zealand and the UK through this analytical framework but also uses this empirical detail to develop the nature of this theoretical base by adding new dimensions concerning organisational resistance.
Introduction
When organisations are faced with changes that they do not wish to adopt, and which they perceive to be threatening, their overarching concern is to moderate and 'absorb' the worst effects of these disturbances.
This 'absorption process' has been primarily seen as a set of activities within the organisation -it is an intuitive, internalised and seemingly invisible, private set of organisational reactive responses to unwanted environmental disturbances. This often involves locking key organisational actors into the absorption process creating what organisational psychoanalysts refer to as 'specialist work groups' (cf. Bion, 1968; DeBoard, 1978; Kets de Vries and Miller, 1984) or, using a more descriptive term, 'absorbing groups'. The workings of these 'absorbing groups' are complex and varied and heavily dependent on context. However, there are also a set of resistance strategies, again involving absorbing strategies and absorbing groups, which develop a much more external, visible and public process. Both resistance strategies can be equally as effective or ineffective depending on the circumstances. The difference is that in the internalised form resistance is less obvious. It is, in effect, a private process which is often disguised and hidden. In the externalised form resistance strategies are very obvious. They become a public challenge to the unwanted changes that are being imposed. The primary focus of this paper is on the latter form of resistance strategies using the specific example of general medical practices (GP practices hereafter) in the UK and New Zealand to provide illustration of the processes. The resistance strategies in this context, as will become apparent, involves the absorbing groups becoming separate, satellite organisations, distinct from the affected organisations in question, whose fundamental purpose is to undermine the original environmental disturbances.
Organisational resistance and absorption is seen as normal by some societal and organisational theorists yet not by others. Where organisations are seen as a creation of a societally generated discursive lifeworld, as in the theoretical analysis of Habermas (cf. 1984 Habermas (cf. , 1987 , and are guided by steering media that are expressing these lifeworld values, then organisational resistance is unlikely. However, there are a number of configurations where this dynamic balance between lifeworld, steering media and organisations is disturbed leading to an inevitable move to organisational resistance (cf. Broadbent, Laughlin and Read, 1991; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993, 1996b) . Equally, organisational theorists, organisational psychoanalysts and those concerned with organisational activist movements (cf. Heath and Nelson, 1986; Pattakos, 1992) expect organisational resistance to occur. There is another significant literature, which is rather more developed theoretically, which argues instead that the dictates of environmental forces produce normalising, rather than resisting, tendencies within organisations. This literature, broadly described as neo-institutional theory (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) maintains that '...highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture and output' (DiMaggio and Powell (1983) p. 147) . In this context institutional theory has '…tended to focus on conformity rather than resistance, passivity rather than activeness and preconscious acceptance rather than political manipulation in response to external pressures and expectations' (Oliver (1991) p.143) .
In this paper we take as our dominant starting point the adapted theories of resistance drawn from
Habermas theoretical model of societal evolution but add to this from the seemingly contradictory language and thinking of institutional theory.. We draw from these diverse sources to provide an understanding not only of the empirical cases but other instances where organisational resistance is apparent. One of the arguments of this paper is that such dichotomous positions are too simplistic. We seek to bring these seemingly opposing forces together to develop a framework for analysis. In doing so we attempt to extend and develop the work of institutional theorists such as Oliver (1991) who have tried tentatively to address the issue of organisational resistance within an institutional theory framework. Like Oliver we maintain there is much within institutional theory that provides a powerful explanator of organisational behaviour.
Yet we are also aware that there are serious gaps in this modeling which can be developed interactively through drawing from other theoretical sources as well as through the empirical cases being analysed. As such, therefore, the paper can be seen as an argument for theoretical eclecticism but not without clear privileging of perspective. Fundamentally the paper is grounded in Habermasian thought but adds to this theoretical understanding through alternative conceptual bases that provide complementary additions to and amplifications of this perspective.
The specific empirical focus is upon the UK and New Zealand both of whom have experienced considerable accounting-led changes that involve new contractual expectations and allied budgetary and accounting controls. Some of these changes have been internally absorbed, though less obvious, in effect, private processes which have been extraordinarily effective in protecting the 'genetic code' of these organisations, as , Jacobs (1995) and Broadbent and Laughlin (forthcoming) indicate. However, in some instances in both nations, there has also been an externalised and obvious form of resistance to some of the changes. In the UK a central example of this public response is the emergence of GP 'commissioning' of secondary care (by working with the purchasing Health Authorities) to counter and resist the perceived injustices of granting secondary care purchasing rights to selected GP fundholders. In New Zealand the emergence of Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs hereafter) has been the GPs' organisational response to the imposition of financial contracts. With the introduction of IPAs, the New Zealand Government authorities contract not with GP practices directly but with the IPAs who, in turn, take responsibility for the financial and other forms of budgetary control of GP practices. In both cases the intention was and is to deal with the intended change strategy at source through the creation of satellite organisations rather than leave the organisations themselves (the GP practices) with the problem of absorption. This paper explores and compares the nature and functioning of commissioning in the UK and IPAs in New Zealand through the lens of the different theoretical perspectives described above. Whilst our general focus will be on commissioning and IPAs in the UK and New Zealand, given the diversity of local expressions of these general responses, we will also concentrate on more detailed examples. In the UK we will focus on the commissioning model in Nottingham and in
New Zealand we will give particular attention to the Pegasus IPA in Canterbury in the South Island.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three substantive sections followed by a conclusion. The next section explores the background and the changing nature of GP commissioning in the UK with specific emphasis on the Nottingham experience. The second section explores the emergence and operation of IPAs in New Zealand with particular focus on the Pegasus IPA group. The third section analyses, compares and contrasts the two examples and provides an amplification through the introduction of a theoretical understanding of organisational responses to unwanted change. The conclusion not only summarises the main themes of the paper but also reflects on some theoretical and empirical implications coming from the analysis.
It is important to highlight how we see the relationship between theories and the empirical detail that follows. Our position can broadly be described as 'middle range thinking' (Laughlin, 1995) . One of the key characteristics of this perspective is the view that theory can never fully explain social phenomena. The ontological assumption upon which this is built is that prior theories from other social situations are always going to be partial explanations of the sites currently being explored. Theory will always be 'skeletal' requiring the unique empirical insights ('flesh') to complement and complete our understanding of any situation. In this paper, because of our respect for and perceived relevance of the empirical detail, we start with this and then introduce any amplifying theory in the analysis section. This ordering could be reversed but the suggested arrangement allows the theory to be used as it should be in 'middle range thinking' -as a way to inform, amplify and structure the empirical insights whilst at the same time not to detract and abstract from the important specific detail. It would be wrong to assume that the portrayal of this empirical detail will be unaware of the analytical framework that follows and will, to a certain extent, mould its initial description, but we will wait until the analysis section to make this connection clear.
General Practice in the UK: Commissioning versus Fundholding
The National Health Service (NHS) in the UK has undergone a major transformation in the last few years.
The basis of many of these Reforms (as we will refer to them) is contained in the various provisions in the National Health Service and Community Care Act of 1990 although they are neither fully encapsulated in this Act of Parliament nor originating only from 1990 (cf. Broadbent, Laughlin and Read, 1991) . Whilst there are numerous elements within the reforms, two of significance stand out: firstly, the introduction of a managed market with defined purchasers and providers (and allied contractual changes reinforced through budgetary and accounting controls) and secondly, strengthening, through the purchasing arrangements, the 'gateway' (cf. Shapiro, Smith and Walsh, 1996) into secondary (hospital) care.
Key in both these concerns is the role GP practices play in the purchase of secondary care. Originally the intention was to have only two major purchasers -the Family Health Service Authorities, for primary care, and the District Health Authorities for secondary care. As from April 1996 these have been combined to become one major purchasing authority of both primary and secondary care. Whilst this amalgamation has resolved some problems it still has not addressed the role of the third group involved in purchasing secondary care -the GP practices who have chosen to become 'fundholders'. The introduction of GP fundholders as secondary care purchasers was an eleventh hour change introduced in the reforms by the then Secretary of State for Health (Kenneth Clark).
The fundholding GP practices were initially seen as something of an anomaly but have created considerable uncertainty as to whom should really be the purchaser of secondary care. The original intention of the health reforms was to separate the provision of care and its purchase. However, fundholders were and are providers of primary care but they also became purchasers of secondary care, inextricably mixing the purchaser and the provider role. Initially this anomaly was controlled by heavily restricting both entrance qualifications as to who could become fundholders as well as what secondary care could and could not be purchased. However, during the previous Conservative Party Administration (which commenced in 1979 and ended in May 1997 following the General Election where the Labour Party was elected) fundholding GP practices were given increasing pre-eminence as purchasers of secondary care. The introduction of 'a primary care led NHS' in 1994 (see Executive Letter EL (94)79 'Developing NHS Purchasing and GP Fundholding -Towards a Primary Care Led NHS') gave impetus to encouraging GP fundholders to become the total purchasers of secondary care. The logic this time was to support the philosophy that money should follow the patients making the GPs the only 'gateway' to secondary care both in terms of patient referrals as well as the financial implications of these referrals. This move in 1994 was followed by a range of experiments with 'total purchasing' (see below) as well as a considerable flurry of Government White Papers (Choice and Opportunity (October 1996) and Delivering the Future (December 1996)) advocating the role of GP practices as well as a Bill (November 1996) and finally an Act (National Health Service (Primary Care) Act -enacted in April prior to the dissolution of Parliament before the General Election)
which amongst other things allowed legally experimental 'pilot' projects such as 'total purchasing'. Despite the massive take-up of fundholding, there has been considerable disquiet in both political and medical circles about the role of fundholding and its expansion into 'total purchasing'. The rationale for 'going fundholding' is complex and uncertain (see Laughlin, Broadbent and Shearn, 1992; Glennerster, Owens and Matsaganis, 1992; Wisley, 1993) yet it is clearly connected with the desire on the part of GPs to have a greater say over the workings of secondary care and the consultants who offer these services as well as a genuine desire to offer a more comprehensive service to their patients. There is also a sense, as the fundholding initiative progressed, that there was no alternative and therefore there was a danger that GPs would get 'left behind' if they failed to join the scheme. This was exacerbated in the period after the Conservative Government were returned for a fourth term in 1992. At this point fundholding seemed inevitable and impossible to stop and the only form of defence seemed to be to sign up and 'go with the flow'. Since then the additional take-up has slowed. Whether this was to do with arriving at hard core resistance or the awareness of possible alternatives (such as commissioning) remains uncertain. For some of those who have joined the scheme there was a dawning disillusionment about its success despite the continuing advocates (cf. Wisley, 1993 to reduce the worrisome ethical 'two tier' effect whereby some patients are given preferential treatment in a national health service devoted to equality of access (cf. Keeley, 1993; Iliffe and Freudenstein, 1994 So instead of 3,500 fundholding GP practices and 100 health authorities their will instead be approximately 500 new Primary Care Groups/Trusts who will constitute the purchasers of secondary care. The new proposed strategy which gives a significant new position and responsibility to GPs is partly borne out of the success and popularity of fundholding but it is also clearly related to the considerable influence of GP commissioning groups which were specifically suet up to undermine fundholding. It is to the emergence and functioning of these commissioning groups we now turn.
It was out of this conflicting political and medical views concerning fundholding that GPs around the country decided to develop their own alternative to the growth in fundholding. Soon after the Conservative Government was returned for a record fourth term and at the height of the political support for fundholding and at the lowest ebb for many GPs a genuine alternative to fundholding was being developed. In a number of places throughout the UK, commissioning, or non-fundholding groups, started to emerge to provide a challenge to fundholding. In essence, commissioning involves an active involvement by GPs '..to obtain equitable access to quality secondary care for their patients while avoiding the bureaucracy and conflicts of interest which arise from fundholding' (Black, Birchall and Trimble (1994) p.930). The overarching philosophy of these emerging groups has two major characteristics. Firstly, to support the case that the District Health Authorities (DHAs) should be the only purchaser of secondary care since, at this level, equitable purchasing could occur, something not possible with the more limited perspectives and responsibilities of fundholders. In this sense they accepted the quasi -market as given but resolved the disagreements as to who should be the purchasers of secondary care by putting their full support for the DHAs to have this responsibility. At one level they would probably have preferred not to have the market reforms in the first place but could see little chance of dismantling the system as a whole but saw distinct advantages in sorting out what they saw as major problems created by fundholding which '...undermined the principle of equity on which the NHS was founded' (Black, Birchall and Trimble (1994) p. 930).
Secondly, that all GPs should play a full part in the actual purchasing undertaken by DHAs. Their role was to be an important voice in this purchasing process with due regard to the referral patterns of all GPs. In this sense they were looking to achieve all the advantages originally put forward for fundholding (vis active involvement in the decision concerning the provision of secondary care for the benefits of patients) without the disadvantages of the bureaucracy and inequalities generated by fundholding. The overall intention was to undermine fundholding by the creation of a positive alternative which would appeal to both GPs as well as those politicians wedded to the development of fundholding.
These commissioning groups emerged in a number of parts of the country which led to the call for a national association to represent these diverse groups politically. The formation of this national association Apart from clarifying purposes and aims the NACGP has attempted to be clear and precise about the terms they use. Thus commissioning is defined as 'the process of gathering and analysing the wants and needs of a population, and identifying the services required to meet those needs' which is to be contrasted with purchasing which involves 'the interpretation of commissioning plans, and the construction and implementation of time-related purchasing plans'. They also define and distinguish between equity ('the appropriate use of resources within a given population based upon individual clinical need and agreed criteria of priorities that apply throughout that population') and equality ('the distribution of resources throughout a population on an equal, unitary basis regardless of need'). The NACGP is concerned with 'equitable commissioning' not purchasing on the basis of an equality criteria. The logo for the NACGP was 'bridging the divide' inspired by the Iron Bridge at Telford to symbolise 'bridging the divide between disparate groups for the common good' (A Briefing Report p.2).
In May 1995 56 Commissioning Groups were full members of the NACGP representing 5,000 GPs and 11 million patients with a further 50 groups in the process of making submission to join. As at the time of writing this number continues to grow. The NACGP is now an important national organisation which has regular conferences and quarterly newsletters and wide exposure in the medical press but more importantly it has growing political influence -one of its main aims, as indicated above. Whilst the NACGP has been exerting an important national influence the diverse and different local commissioning models continue to develop somewhat independently. As indicated above the NACGP sees its role as enabling rather than determining how commissioning works in particular localities.
The Nottingham Non-Fundholders (NNFH) are one commissioning group and it is to a detailed consideration of its workings that we now move. Nottingham Health Authority has responsibility for purchasing secondary health care for a population of 641,000. The area has reasonably high levels of deprivation in the inner city but overall has reasonable socio-economic wealth -thus only 9 out of the 104 wards attract GP deprivation payments (all statistics are drawn from Shapiro, Smith and Walsh (1996) ). In terms of secondary care there are two large teaching hospital trusts, a community health services trust as well as a trust for providing mental health, learning disabilities and medical care for the elderly. There are 118 GP practices with 321 GPs of which only 20% of the population (in 1992) was served through fundholding GP practices.
This relatively low level of GP practices who were fundholders provided the context in August 1992 for a group of Nottingham GPs to come together to deliberately undermine the further development of
fundholding. An initial meeting was called to ascertain support at which 39 general practitioners attended (Black, Birchall and Trimble (1994) by the NNFH has, in effect, ended all further recruitment in the area for GPs to become fundholders.
In the last few years the NNFH has been slowly increasing its influence over the purchasing of secondary care by the Nottingham Health Authority. Its mission statement formed at the first meeting of the new organisation, and still remaining unchanged, is as follows:
'To ensure the purchasing of quality secondary care which is equitably available to the patients of all general practitioners, and to co-operate in this endeavour with all interested bodies'
Initially the Executive of the NNFH concentrated on purchasing of ear, nose and throat surgery, orthopaedics and ophthalmology -areas which are often the focus of fundholding practices as Shapiro,
Smith and Walsh (1996 p.18) make plain. From this the NNFH moved to playing a part in the purchasing on the four dominant programmes of care (referred to as a 'healthier future' (vis health promotion, child health etc.), 'health maintenance' (vis accident and emergency, general surgery etc.), 'ill health and disability' (vis cardiac services, oncology etc.) and 'mental health') which constitute the main purchasing areas of Nottingham Health Authority. In all these areas the NNFH has attempted to provide commissioning advice to the Health Authority on behalf of all the GP membership. Whether Such has been the success of the NNFH that they decided to attempt to develop their commissioning influence even further by becoming what they refer to as a 'Total Commissioning Project'. In 1995 the Executive of the NNFH proposed that they become involved with the Health Authority as joint purchases of secondary care. This move by the Executive of the NNFH whilst gaining support from those they represent was rejected by the NHS Executive. The alternative suggested was that the NNFM became a 'multifund' and elect to become a total purchaser of secondary care. This option was rejected by the NNFH Executive due, not surprisingly, to '...philosophical objections to the idea of a 'super fund' with GPs actually holding budgets' seeing itself as a 'commissioning rather than purchasing group' (quotes from Shapiro, Smith and Walsh (1996) p. 20). It was not so much the purchasing that was the real issue -after all the proposal was requesting to become involved jointly with the purchase of secondary care -but the continuing dangers of two tierism and inequities which fundholding involved, the destruction of which was and is the central purpose of the NNFH. The NNFH tried again in 1996 to push for the joint purchasing The successes of the NNFH have clearly been considerable yet at the same time they are not without problems of influence as well as facing the potential dangers of a shift away from original purposes in terms of activities In relation to influence, Shapiro, Smith and Walsh (1996) quote from the NNFH Executive that at times it has been 'a tug trying to turn around the health authority tanker' (p.19) or perceiving itself as 'fragile', '...holding together the 'jelly' of the health authority, the trusts and the GPs' (p.20). It is clearly too early to know how this new partnership will work out for all involved or where it will lead. If could well create even more 'wobble' in the 'jelly'. It might even create some tension with the GPs to whom the NNFH Executive are representing. Some of the potential difficulties are hinted at in Shapiro, Smith and Walsh (1996, p.29) where they have noted a growing 'quid pro quo' in the commissioning arrangements around the country such that 'GPs delivered change amongst primary care colleagues in return for influence on the authority's strategy for the whole district population'. Whether this will be the case in Nottingham when the NNFH become joint or sole purchasers (if they become a Primary Care Trust) remains to be seen. But clearly the potential for this to happen as the NNFH gets ever closer to the heart of purchasing, rejected as a fundholder but sought after at District level, must be there.
The dangers of not only growing distant from the original roots but also running the risk of being caught into a new and different controlling role must be within the bounds of possibility.
In summary, in this section, we have illustrated how, in seeking to control disturbances that affect GP practices, certain strategies can lead to the emergence of new organisations -GP commissioning groups. This change, initially at local levels, has, in turn, created yet another organisation (the National Association of Commissioning GPs) who are pursuing yet another agenda maybe only partially recognised at the outset of the difficulties. What the case study of Nottingham illustrates is the growing success of this movement in terms of influence. It also indicates that there is always a danger of growing distance not only from the original agenda but also from the originators, as satellite organisations are created with their own independence and direction. Before developing this analysis we will add further empirical details from New Zealand, another nation which has undergone considerable change in the area of general medical practice.
General Practice in New Zealand: The Rise of Independent Practitioner Associations
Despite its small size New Zealand seems to have become a test case for public sector reform. So much so that some commentators have started to talk about the New Zealand model (Boston et al., 1996) . During the 1980s a succession of governmental initiatives shifted the country from a classic welfare state to what has been presented as an entrepreneurial economy (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) . The exchange rate was floated, most of the subsidies to primary producers were eliminated, as were the protection for local manufacturers against imports. However, some of the most notable changes related to the structure and operation of the public sector where many of the state activities were privatised. While health care remained part of the 'core public sector' it was also significantly changed through the introduction of a managed market and the separation of purchaser and provider functions.
Between the 1930s and the 1980s health services in New Zealand were organised in three discrete sectors.
Primary health care was delivered by general practitioners, usually operating in groups, with partial fee for service subsidies from the state. The secondary care sector was provided regionally via locally elected hospital boards serving a defined population with hospital services. They operated with block grants from the government which evolved through the 1980s into a population based funding formula (Fougere, 1993) .
Population or public health services were organised centrally by the Department of Health and delivered through regional offices.
The origin of the New Zealand health care system can be found in a proposal to modify the English National Health Insurance Scheme of 1911 to meet local needs (New Zealand Department of Health, 1974, p. 43) . The idea was that the government would provide a universal health service, free to all members of the community requiring medical attention. However, the concept of the free medical service met with resistance from the New Zealand branch of the British Medical Association (B.M.A), who were keen to maintain a fee-for-service relationship with patients. The product of the confrontation between the Government and the medical profession was a fragmented health system; a centrally funded secondary care service and state subsidised fee-for-service arrangement for the GPs. While doctors within the secondary service were employed by the State, the only contract for GPs was a statutory declaration at the bottom of the claim form, which stated that they had delivered the services personally and in accordance with the respective legislation (Social Security Act 1938).
Between 1984 and 1990 the hospital and the public health services were significantly restructured.
Fourteen Area Health Boards were created with combined responsibility for hospital services and public health provision. The funding arrangements also changed from historical budget allocations to a population based funding formula. However, the change from Hospital Board to Area Health Board was not just a change in structure and funding, it also reflected the shift away from public sector management practices and a shift towards private sector practices and contractual accountability, sometimes referred to as general management (Scott, 1994, p. 28) . Gibbs et al. (1988) was critical of the triumvirate model of management found in hospitals and strongly recommended the creation of a single chief executive. General management was introduced into the whole public sector through the State Sector Act 1988. By 1990
broadly defined contractual relationships were established between the Area Health Boards and the Minister of Health (Davies, 1990 ).
However, primary care provision and funding was relatively unaffected by these changes and was not subject to the same contractual requirements as the Area Health Boards. The fact that the budgetary exposure associated with primary care was not capped caused considerable concern to those within Treasury. The steady decrease in the real value of the GP subsidies caused concern among GPs who saw reduction in their income. The Department of Health was concerned with issues of access. The Department argued that GPs needed to reduce their charges so that there would not be a financial barrier to the poor receiving health services. However, an increase in the GP subsidy was seen as 'putting tax-payers money into the pockets of GPs' as there was usually no change in what the patients had to pay. Therefore, in 1990 the Minister of Health offered GPs additional subsidies if they would enter into service contracts with the government. The subsidies would be indexed to the CPI and GPs would not be allowed to charge more than a fixed schedule fee, set at $29 when the scheme was proposed. The contract proposal was seen by the government as a 'business-like approach to health ' (McShane, 1990) and by the GPs as a threat to their autonomy and income. Fifty-five practices accepted the contract proposal (Matherson and Hoskins, 1992) , covering fewer than 6% of the patient population. However, most GPs were strongly opposed to the contracts (McPherson, 1990) , suggesting that the government could not be trusted.
In December 1990 the newly elected National Government turned their back on the controversial GP contracts and the Area Health Board structure. While the Area Health Boards did not have enough time to prove themselves, the new government argued that the system was flawed, inefficient and inequitable because of cost shifting, provider capture and managerial incompetence ( Upton, 1991) . They commissioned a taskforce to propose a new structure based on a separation between the purchasing and the provision of health care. The work of the taskforce formed the basis of a government policy document released by the Minister of Health in 1991 (Upton, 1991) . The major focus of the document was on the structure and management of secondary services which were split into separate purchaser (Regional Health Authorities -RHAs) and provider (Crown Health Enterprises -CHEs) organisations. The RHA received a fixed budget and were responsible for contracting with 'providers' for health services. While the obvious 'providers' were the state owned CHEs, the RHA could also purchase services from private and voluntary institutions when that would provide better 'value for money'.
One important theme in the policy document was the integration of funding. Since 1938 the funding arrangements for GPs and for secondary services have been fragmented. Upton (1991) argued that this was one of the major problems with the system and had led to "poor patient management, poor access, inappropriate allocation of resources and cost shifting" (p. 14). The fragmented funding system was seen as a barrier to co-operation between GPs and hospitals and a major cause of resource wastage within the health system. Therefore the integration of primary and secondary funding into a single budget held by the RHA was a major objective of the change (Upton, 1991 p.41) . Another important benefit was that the centralised budget would cap primary care spending (p. 48).
How the restructure would affect general practitioners was not made clear in the 1991 document. However, it did become obvious that as the RHAs held the budget for both primary and secondary services, that GPs would be forced to establish some form of direct contract with their local RHA. Through a structural change process the government achieved the two objectives that they failed to achieve through the 1990 contract proposal: the GP budget was capped through the allocation of fixed budgets for primary care to the RHAs and a formal contractual relationship was established for GPs. Upton (1991) presented five different forms that the contracts between GPs and the RHAs might take:
• Salaries -salary contracts are often accompanied by performance agreements, which specify what hours should be worked and what responsibilities should be fulfilled.
• Fee-for-service -Under this arrangement the provider is paid a fee for each consultation or procedure. Sometimes the doctor sets this fee; sometimes it is a fixed amount negotiated between the doctor and the insurer or government agency which pays the fee.
• Capitation -the doctor or other care provider is paid an annual fee for each patient enrolled in their practice.
• Risk-sharing contracts -doctors can be placed on contracts under which they bear a share of the cost of any prescriptions, diagnostic tests, hospital admissions, and so on, which they order for their patients. These kind of contracts can be used to encourage doctors to choose cost-effective care for their patients, and strive to prevent their patients needing high-cost care.
• Budget-holding contracts -budget-holding is a type of risk sharing contract. The doctor is given an annual budget for each client enrolled with their practice, and required to meet all of the costs of their prescriptions, diagnostic tests, and perhaps the costs of some other referrals, from this budget. This type of contract, with some modifications has been introduced in some general practices in the United Kingdom. (Upton (1991) p.48) Upton (1991, p.50) recognised that the relationship between successive governments and the medical profession over payment arrangements had been troubled and that doctors saw the introduction of contracts as state control and interference. However, he argued that "…devolving responsibility for primary care funding would at least partially allay some of the concerns of doctors about negotiation with the Government over subsidies for primary care" (p. 50). Considering the historical tensions this statement seems impossibly optimistic. GPs had little incentive to trust the RHAs, which were seen as being as bad, if not worse than the Government. And having resisted the contractual arrangements offered by the State, it seems curious that they would then embrace contracts offered by the RHAs.
In May 1992 the National Interim Provider Board released their report on the provision of health services under the new structure. While they were silent on the place of primary care providers, they were very clear that the new system would be built on competition and business practices. Hospitals would be expected to operate at a profit and to pay dividends to the State. The message to GPs was that if they wanted to retain state funding they would have to restructure themselves as businesses.
While a few practices were willing to enter into the competitive market arrangements and negotiate their own contracts with the RHA most practices chose to accept what came to be known as Section 51 agreements or joined together to negotiate some form of collective agreements through an Independent Practice Association (IPA).
When the 1993 Health and Disabilities Service Act was being drafted there were strong submissions from the medical profession concerning the form of contracts that GPs would have to accept. The NZMA (New Zealand Medical Association) argued that some GPs may be unwilling to enter into explicit purchase agreements with the RHAs and if some exception was not made for them it would significantly disadvantage their patients. Therefore, a special provision was made under Section 51 of the Health and Disabilities Services Act where a RHA could give notice of a set of terms and conditions and individual GPs could claim from the RHA if they accepted the published terms and conditions. The Section 51 arrangement provided a way for individual GPs to continue practising and claiming the state subsidy without signing a formal contract with the RHA. However, under Section 51 the RHA is free to change the conditions at any point and could enforce the published terms and conditions as if a contract was signed. In effect Section 51 instituted a pseudo-contract even if GPs were unwilling to sign a formal one; individual GPs were faced with the fact that if they wanted to continue in practice, they had to accept some kind of contractual arrangement with the RHA (pseudo or real).
Faced with the inevitability of managed care and the threat of bureaucratic intrusion into GP autonomy (Marshall, 1992) , the New Zealand GP Association (NZGPA) took an initiative in the development of new primary care structures.
'The reform process presented us with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity chance to participate in health care management. The green fields of the purchaser-provider split gave GPs the choice of establishing structures which would allow the decisions affecting management to be taken by doctors in consultation with other appropriate health care providers.' (Marshall (1992) While the project team (UniServices, 1992) commented on the UK GP fundholding experiments, they felt that fundholding would not be practical in New Zealand without significant improvements in management and supporting services. They recommended that GPs contract with the RHAs on a collective basis as part of an IPA. They defined an IPA as:
'….an organisation of health care providers entering into some form of contractual arrangement with health care purchasers to provide specified health care to patients. IPAs can take many forms including partnerships, associations, non-profit or for-profit corporations.'
(UniServices (1992) p. ii)
They suggested that IPAs could be built around the existing primary care provision structures of solo practitioners and cost-sharing GP partnerships. However, individual practices were considered too small to carry the financial and managerial resources and to share the risk associated with capitated budget arrangements. The objectives of an IPA were outlined as follows):
1. To contract with RHAs and independent purchasers to provide personal care services. 2. To promote and maintain procedures for utilisation review, quality assurance and peer review. 3. To offer members financial management services, including risk and insurance services. (Uniservices (1992) p.25) The Uniservices IPA model was strongly informed by the HMO models of managed care developed in the USA and came at a time when GPs were deeply concerned that they would lose control to secondary care services if the RHAs chose to fund a vertically integrated CHE that sub-contracted primary health services.
The Uniservices report picked up ideas introduced in Upton (1991) and presented the vertically integrated CHE as a real possibility. Perhaps one of the most attractive features of the IPA proposal was the suggestion that it would place GPs in a stronger position and opened a real opportunity that GPs may be funded by the RHA to purchase secondary services. The IPA model also satisfied the NZGPA concern that individual GPs and practices would retain their identity, while still having some influence on the management process.
The concept of the IPA was perceived as a 'win-win' situation for all sides and provided an effective mechanism to operationalise the new contracting arrangements. The IPA structure satisfied the concern of the Health Reforms Directorate to develop the kind of risk sharing contracts mentioned in Upton (1991) .
The RHA's could cut their contracting costs as they would only need to contract with a few IPAs as compared to hundreds of GPs. The NZGPA saw the way to maintain the individual independence and autonomy of GPs. Many GPs were concerned that their funding would come under the control of hospital management and would therefore be reduced. The development of IPAs was seen as an effective way to protect GP interests against the threat of the state, the RHA and secondary services (Malcolm, 1993) .
The IPAs have now become an important feature of the New Zealand health care system. Both Malcolm and Powell (1996) and Foresearch (1995) have conducted studies of IPA development in New Zealand. Malcolm and Powell (1996) conducted a questionnaire survey of all known IPAs (42 organisations currently). They found that over 60% of New Zealand GPs are part of an IPA (the rest have chosen the Section 51 fee-for-service arrangements); five IPAs accept nurses in their membership and of those IPAs that formed legal entities, 19 were limited liability companies, three were incorporated societies and one was a charitable trust. Malcolm and Powell (1996) suggest that the most important reason for the formation of IPAs was to "protect the status of general practice in the fact of considerable uncertainty" (186). Other objectives, such as "making better use of primary care resources", "improving the health of the community you serve" and "becoming a stronger negotiating body" were also highly rated by respondents. Foresearch (1995) interviewed a sample of 102 GPs from around New Zealand. Half of the GPs interviewed belonged to an IPA. Those that had joined IPAs believed that if they negotiated with the RHA as a group they would secure a better contract; they also thought that membership in an IPA would protect them from intrusion into their decision making and reduction of their autonomy and saw the IPA as a good way of 'keeping up with the health changes'. The main 'drawback' with IPA membership was the extra time and paper work involved, however, some GPs also felt that there was some loss of autonomy.
Jacobs (1997) Upon formation Pegasus began negotiating a collective contract with the Southern RHA. By November 1993 a contract was established. The Southern RHA agreed to maintain the fee-for-service relationship and subsidise GPs at the same level as they had received previously. The only significant difference was the development of pilot 'budget holding projects' described in Jacobs (1997) .
Many GPs were uncomfortable about the contracting consequences of the 1993 Act and were daunted by the size and complexity and 'risks' associated with the Section 51 notices. By contrast the collective contract offered by Pegasus was seen as being a lot simpler and much less of a threat for individual GPs and GP practices; removing them directly from the influence of the State and the RHA. Signing the collective contract was also a condition for continued membership as part of Pegasus. Effectively GPs gave up their right to send subsidy claims to the RHA and became a subcontractor to Pegasus for the provision of primary health services. Jacobs (1997) described a number of reasons why GPs accepted the collective contract and became part of the Pegasus IPA, reasons that were consistent with what Foresearch (1995) and Malcolm and Powell (1996) had found. Perhaps the most important reason for joining the IPA was the fact that Pegasus provided a buffer or protection against the changes. Many of the GPs also felt that they would get a better contractual deal with the RHA if they were part of a larger group. The few examples of GP practices that had negotiated their own contracts did little to convince other GP to also adopt that approach (Jacobs and Barnett, 1996) .
A third reason for getting involved in IPAs was that this was seen as an effective way for GPs to gain more control over the reform process. The change was seen by many as being unavoidable. From that perspective there was a simple choice, either GPs got involved in the process or they would lose their historical power, autonomy and control over resources to someone appointed by the state.
In September 1994 the Southern RHA released an important policy document stating that their primary concern was not with the practice subsidies but with reducing expenditure on pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests. In managing their fixed budget the RHA had discovered that there was less than a 1% growth in the subsidy, but the costs associated with pharmaceuticals and laboratory tests was predicted to grow at 8-9% for the next three years. The RHA also announced that their strategy for reducing spending in these areas was through 'budget-holding' arrangements with IPAs and GP associations. For GPs these proposals were a major relief. With the shift in focus away from the practice subsidies, their income was no longer in threat. Because the 'budget-holding' arrangements were mediated by the IPAs, individual felt protected from the threat to their autonomy.
In summary, the formation of IPAs in New Zealand had mixed beginnings. For those that formed them it was clear that they were meant to subvert the requirement for individual GPs to contract with the RHA.
However, for those responsible for implementing the reforms they offered a mechanism to simplify the contracting process and to transfer risk from the RHA to the GPs. While it is clear that IPAs protect individual GPs from the obligations of contracting, it is not clear that they successfully transferred risk.
None of the projects developed by Pegasus in conjunction with the Southern RHA involved the GPs in accepting any risk for overspending, either at individual, practice or IPA level (Jacobs, 1997) . Malcolm and Powell (1996) also observed that most IPAs firmly rejected the notion of accepting personal risk for the growth in health services.
It is a little unclear what the future for IPAs will be. However, it is clear that they are here to remain and will continue to have a significant role in health provision. With the announcement after the 1997 election that the RHAs will become a single purchasing body individual IPAs are likely to gain more power in a regional area and might even start joining together throughout the country. There is some evidence that the IPAs are allowing GPs to 'redress the balance' between primary and secondary care. Many GPs perceived themselves as the 'poor relations' of hospital doctors who seemed to be able to get both better funding and better incomes than the GPs. While GP purchasing of secondary services is not currently occurring, it is being widely discussed and in some cases strongly promoted (Malcolm and Powell, 1996) ; indeed one IPA has requested permission to purchase the local hospital and manage the provision of secondary services in their area.
Analysis and Commentary
As indicated in the introduction, the primary focus of the paper is with the notion of organisational resistance to accounting-led changes and the way this resistance has been expressed in the particular context of GP practices in the UK and New Zealand. To understand this resistance rather better, and thus provide an amplifying (middle range) analysis and commentary on the empirics that have been presented, we start from the theoretical perspective of Habermas' model of society. We will then explore a number of key dimensions of institutional theory to provide an important amplification of these Habermasian theoretical models. Finally, we will use this synthesis to provide a theoretical understanding and analysis of the UK and New Zealand cases of resistance in General Practice.
(i) Habermas' Model of Society
Habermas' model of society (cf. Habermas, 1984 Habermas, , 1987 is built on the simple premise that out of discourse over time we create views of our world, our social relationships and ourselves. This changing set of understandings forms a societal lifeworld. It is from this discursively agreed level of understanding, that we create separate and distinct systems (functional organisations such as those devoted to producing goods and services) in societies which reflect different aspects of this lifeworld at a particular moment in time. To the extent that systems, once created, have a potential to become separate and separable from the lifeworld in a complex society (they, in effect, obtain their own independence through creating their own 'micro' lifeworld guiding 'micro' systems) Habermas suggests this causes the need for the creation of steering media (such as law -see Habermas (1992) and Power and Laughlin (1996) for more details) to ensure that systems continue to reflect lifeworld demands. Whilst this is a very simple model at one level it is also one which provides a powerful 'skeletal' language for an understanding the way societies organise themselves. With suitable amplification (see Broadbent, Laughlin and Read, 1991; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993, 1996b ) it provides a base to help theorise and understand organisational resistance.
At a fundamental level organisational (systems) resistance will be apparent in one of two major scenarios.
The first is when the organisational system has moved away from expressing the societal lifeworld and resists legitimate steering mechanisms (i.e. those emanating from a steering media which is following societal lifeworld requirements). A typical example might be an illegal organisation selling harmful drugs which resists the intrusion of the widely accepted law trying to break the drug business and imprison the organisational actors. The second case is where the organisational system has not moved away from expressing the societal lifeworld but rather the societal steering media has. In this case there is illegitimate steering behaviour by the steering media and consequent resistance by the organisational system. A typical example discussed by Habermas (1987 p.364 et seq) is the way law can move beyond appropriate levels of 'structural coupling' to the societal lifeworld and become 'juridified' (cf. Teubner, 1987; Laughlin and Broadbent, 1993) . Both forms of resistance occur but it is arguably the latter (a resistance to follow the demands of an illegitimate steering media) which is the most common. It certainly applies to the empirical case of GP practices in the UK and New Zealand.
(
ii) Institutional Theory
In extending our analysis of these issues we will introduce the additional theoretical language of institutional theory. We do not intend to provide a detailed comprehensive précis of institutional theory or the many studies which have used its logic in understanding both accounting and management systems - Scott (1995) and Edwards, Ezzamel and Robson (1996) have already provided such an important overview -but rather we seek to concentrate on two key dimensions of institutional theory. Firstly, in relation to what is meant by institutions, institutional isomorphism and organisational legitimacy; and, secondly, through an exploration of the 'three pillars of institutions' as Scott (1995, p.35) refers to different forms of institutional contexts.
Institutions, institutional isomorphism and organisational legitimacy are probably the key elements within institutional theory. They are the central factors explaining the perceived generalisation that, over time, organisations have a tendency to move from diversity to similarity in broad underlying structural terms.
Institutional theorists argue this is because of the location of all organisations within a very limited set of institutional contexts. Institutions are wider than organisations but they guide the behaviour and thinking of these organisations. Scott (1995, p. 33 ) defines institutions as consisting of '… cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers -cultures, structures, and routines -and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction'. Since organisations reside within a very limited set of institutional contexts they have strongly isomorphic tendencies. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.149) , drawing inspiration from Hawley (1968) , define isomorphism as '…a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions'. To the institutional theorists it is not just the survival demands of competitive advantage that drives organisations to conform, but the seeking of legitimacy, as defined within certain institutions, that is key. The necessity to legitimate actions and activities according to the dictates of particular institutions is central in understanding the tendency for organisations to move to broad structural levels of similarity rather than diversity. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.150) indicate:
'Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness. The concept of institutional isomorphism is a useful tool for understanding the politics and ceremony that pervade much modern organizational life' Scott (1995, p.34 et seq.) maintains that there are three major 'pillars of institutions' which operate in different ways to mould the behaviour of organisations. He refers to these three pillars as 'regulative', 'normative' and 'cognitive'.
The regulative institutional pillar encompasses all those external forces which are deliberately set up to attempt to influence (regulate) organisational behaviour. As Scott (1995, p.36 ) makes plain '…force, fear and expedience are central ingredients of the regulative pillar, but they are tempered by the existence of rules, whether in the guise of informal mores or formal rules and laws'. These 'mechanisms' are broadly described as 'coercive' leading to DiMaggio and Powell's (1983, p. 150) 'coercive isomorphism' which 'results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function'. This is the most typical of all the institutional contexts and one in which compliance and non-compliance has rewards as well as penalties. It is built on an assumed instrumental rationality by organisations that it is better to comply than to defy, or, more formally, that 'individuals are instrumentally motivated to make their choices according to utilitarian, cost-benefit logic' (Scott (1995) p. 37).
The normative institutional pillar involves the values and norms which drive social behaviour. Wrapped into, in effect, internalised behavioural rules these '….are often regarded as imposing constraints on social behaviour, and so they do. But at the same time, they empower and enable social action. They confer rights and responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, and licenses as well as mandates' (Scott (1995) p.38) . It is the internalised driving power of these values and norms which form the major 'mechanisms' leading to normative isomorphism which DiMaggio and Powell (1983 p. 152) link to 'professionalisation' which they define, following particularly Larson (1977) , as '..the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of work, to control 'the production of producers' ... and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy'. It is this professionalisation process which both illustrates the process of normative isomorphism as well as demonstrating how such a process works to control the thinking, values, norms and behaviour of organisations through which professionals work. Under this assumption their behavioural norms come not from the organisation in which they work but from the professional (institutional) context from which they have gained their membership and from which they draw their 'moral' legitimacy.
The cognitive institutional pillar reflects the inevitable force for organisations to mimic and mirror other organisations who are, in effect, deemed to be both successful and worthy to copy. This institutional context is driven by a seemingly anthropological desire not to be too far away from what is deemed to be 'normal', particularly where there is great uncertainty about what is the correct way to behave and be.
Individual organisations, to Scott (1995, p. 41) , '....do construct and continuously negotiate social reality in everyday life, but they do so within the context of wider, pre-existing cultural systems: symbolic frameworks, perceived to be both objective and external, that provide orientation and guidance'. It is the mechanism of imitation, or 'mimetic processes' as DiMaggio and Powell (1983 p. 151) refer to the tendency for 'organisations to model themselves on other organisations', that is at work here. The assumption is that there is a latent drive within human kind to orthodoxy and, in effect, 'hero worshipping' and 'hero copying' particularly when we are unsure of our own worth and position: 'We seek to behave in conventional ways, in ways that will not cause us to stand out or be noticed as different. Also involved are status processes. We attempt to imitate others whom we regard as superior, as more successful' (Scott (1995) p.45).
Whilst there is much within this framework that is intuitively appealing there are many questions and concerns about both the seemingly deterministic nature of institutions over organisational behaviour and the lack of clarity concerning how the three pillars work in particular organisational situations. The common underlying concern is a lack of evidence of exactly how organisations respond to institutional contexts and processes. Oliver (1991) addresses this concern to some extent and poses a range of alternative organisational strategies/responses to institutional pressures which she describes as acquiescing, compromising, avoiding, defying and manipulating. These strategies, apart from the first, give great credence to organisational resistance and the way organisations can, or rather attempt to, '..dominate or defy external demands' (Oliver (1991) p.150) . This clearly turns institutional theory somewhat on its head and not surprisingly Oliver's work is analysed with some caution by Scott (1995, pp. 128 et seq.) . Whilst
showing an intellectual interest in her 'manipulating' strategy by talking of the 'special interest' to institutional theorists of the '....techniques used by organizations to manipulate views of their legitimacy' he provides a cautionary note at the end that there is a danger that '..organizations that protest too much run the risk of undermining their legitimacy' (Scott (1995) p.131). However, rather more positively in his concluding section exploring priorities for the future for institutional theory he argues strongly that '..we need studies that focus on the relation between institutional and organizational processes' (Scott (1995) p.147). This is echoed by Oliver (1991, p.175) in her concluding sentence when she indicates that because '..the central assumption of institutional theory is that institutional environments exert a potent conforming influence on organizations, the conditions under which these pressures fail in their predicted efforts certainly merit further theoretical and empirical attention'.
Our view is that weaving this language with Habermasian thinking and an analysis of actual resistance strategies (such as the cases discussed in this paper) provide both the theoretical and empirical attention for which Scott is calling .
(iii) A Synthesis
Theoretically the three institutional pillars provide a part understanding of the way organisations function.
In Habermasian terms the normative is related clearly to the dictates of an organisational lifeworld which was originally guided and created by the societal lifeworld. However, because of the ability of organisation to become independent it can 'cut loose' from this important connectedness (as with the case of the illegal organisation described above). The regulative pillar can be seen as relating to the way organisations follow the guidelines of the steering media. The cognitive is not as apparent in Habermasian thinking but could be seen as relating to the way organisations are attracted to follow the behaviour of organisations which have a similar lineage in terms of linkages to the guiding societal lifeworld.
What this weaving of the theoretical languages highlights is two points. Firstly, that the introduction of
Habermasian thinking highlights the central importance of the normative -being the filter and foundation of all organisational life. This is not brought out very strongly in institutional theory. Secondly, institutional theory lacks an analysis of the dynamics and processes when institutional contexts conflict and co-incide.
The introduction of the Habermasian model in the context of the language of institutional theory, makes plain that when the underlying normative institutional pillar guiding organisational life is perceived to be threatened by a regulative and/or cognitive set of forces then resistance to these intrusions is highly likely.
Where the normative is not perceived to be under attack then obedience to laws (confirmation to the regulative institutional context) or to the copying of other organisations (a compliance with the cognitive institutional context) becomes more likely, although not assured.
This refinement preserves yet develops institutional theory. It also develops the Habermasian model by providing a richer theoretical language for understanding organisational processes. What it doesn't do is provide a rationale for why some forms of resistance are more 'private' absorption processes and some 'public'. Our view on this is that this can only be answered through a closer engagement with empirical cases such as those recounted in this paper.
(iv) Analysis
Perhaps we could start this analysis by returning to some of our previous analyses into organisational change processes in the specific context of schools and GP practices (cf. Laughlin, Broadbent, Shearn and Willig-Atherton, 1994; Broadbent and Laughlin, forthcoming) . What this processual analysis poses is a range of 'skeletal' theoretical organisational change pathways, built around notions of first and second order change which is used to amplify the empirical observations from the GP practices and schools. Our previous analysis of GP practices in the UK indicates that accounting-led changes, primarily through the 1990 GP Contract (and subsequent revisions), were considerably resented by GPs. However, rather than allow these to affect core values they have been 'absorbed' by the introduction of two key new actors in General Practice -nurses and practice managers.
These primarily women members of the practice team are there to undertake the accounting-led tasks imposed on GPs by the Government to allow the latter to continue practising medicine much as before.
That this creates new professional possibilities for nurses and practice managers is an important by-product for this absorption process. But still the most important point is that they are in place to absorb the changes so that GPs remain largely untouched by these disturbances. These are internal, more 'private' resistance strategies which have been remarkably successful to date in preventing second order change in GP practices.
Using the language of the theoretical frameworks discussed above these changes are coming from a A development of our understanding of the hierarchical nature of institutions, and organisational reactions when different influencing institutional contexts are in conflict, provides a framework for helping us to understand the emergence of Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs) in New Zealand and of GP commissioning in the UK. What is clear from these reactions is a change of strategy from internal 1 We are well aware of the argument which suggests that the medical profession is indeed out of line with societal expectations and has abused the freedoms given to it. There are ways within Habermasian thinking to make judgements about this and more generally about both the behaviour of the steering media and the normative values of the organisations being directed, in terms of their overall compatibility with the societal lifeworld (see Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) for more details on this). We do not have space here to demonstrate what this involves. Given this situation we are making a value claim here (which we believe we can justify) but have couched this as 'arguably' to prevent unnecessary criticism of making statements which space does not permit us to justify absorption to attempted external absorption with the intention of trying to undermine in a public show of strength the unwanted intrusion. In both cases the normative is perceived to be threatened by the regulative.
In New Zealand the pressure seems to have been the financial volatility, created by having to directly contract with the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). This, not only created financial vulnerability but also, by implication, provided a serious threat to medical autonomy and values. Interestingly, as indicated above, it was never deemed appropriate to absorb this strain through internal processes at the GP practice level. Right from the outset, in New Zealand, the only perceived way to prevent the normative from being undermined and keep the regulative at bay (and thus avoid second order change) was to create separate satellite organisations (IPAs) who became the intermediate contractual unit to 'buffer' the GP practices from the financial and medical volatility created by RHAs.
The emergence of commissioning in the UK follows a similar logic, yet is somewhat more complex.
Fundholding was and is seen as threatening the underlying normative values of providing equitable care to all with its implicit emphasis on 'two -tierism'. We have already seen that GP practices have been extraordinarily able at preventing some of the changes (notably the GP Contract) from affecting core values by internal absorption processes (vis the employment of primarily female practice managers and practice nurses). Yet such a strategy could not stop what was seen as an inevitable slide into all GP practices going down the fundholding route. To protect these normative values a more outgoing deliberate strategy had to be adopted. This was because the normative was not only being threatened by a regulative institutional context but also by a cognitive one as well. A growing number of GP practices were going down the fundholding route and others were signing up for fear of being left behind. Some GPs were of the opinion that such a state of affairs could not be left to an internal absorption process to prevent second order change to the normative values driving the GPs. Instead it required a more direct approach of actually trying to undermine the change by the formation of a direct alternative to fundholding, namely commissioning, and composite sets of separate satellite organisations to push for this alternative.
What this expansion of the empirical detail provides is an interesting comparative question concerning the organisational reaction to the normative challenge in the formation of satellite organisations in the two countries. Whatever the reasons for this difference in terms of timing and nature of reaction in New
Zealand and the UK three things are clear. Firstly, that when a normative institutional context which drives organisational behaviour (in our case behaviour of GP practices in the two countries), is perceived to be threatened by a regulative and/or cognitive institutional environment, organisational resistance will be inevitable and apparent. Secondly, that the actual nature of this organisational resistance will be the emergence of what Bion (1968) refers to as 'specialist work groups' or as we have called them 'absorbing groups' either to internally absorb or absorb through external attacks. Thirdly, that the choice of internal and external processes for the absorbing group is contextually determined.
Conclusions
The primary focus of this paper has been to note a similar reaction within GP practices in New Zealand and the UK to unwanted accounting-led changes. In both cases separate satellite organisations have been created with the sole intention of trying to either control (in New Zealand) or undermine (in the UK) the disturbances. Thus, in New Zealand, the emergence of Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs) came into being as a deliberate way to 'buffer' the worst effects of the GP contractual changes. IPAs became the contractors with the Regional Health Authorities with the former rather than the latter entering into apparently more palatable sub-contracting with the GP practices. In the UK the emergence of separate commission groups and their National Association. was a deliberate strategy which, with the change in Government, is a politically successful, attempt to undermine the perceived unwelcome intrusion of fundholding.
To analyse these changes we have used an amalgam of a Habermasian model of society, theories of organisational change and institutional theory. Whilst, at one level, these are seemingly contradictory theoretical positions by which to analyse these cases, the tensions between these different approaches and their resolution has provided a significant framework for trying to amplify the reasons for the emergence of these satellite organisations. Both the formation of IPAs and commissioning groups are forms of 'absorbing groups' with a deliberate brief to publicly resist unwanted disturbances and so protect the GP practices from which they have been created. Both are examples, therefore, of organisational resistance but can also be explained through Habermasian and institutional theory as clashes between normative, regulative and cognitive institutional contexts. It is the professional, normative values (given credence, we would argue, by the societal lifeworld) that are being preserved through the resistance strategy. These normative values are perceived to be under attack from primarily different forms of accounting-led steering processes (regulation) and, in the case of the UK, cognitive ones. Thus Habermas' model and institutional theory provides a powerful language for explaining these resistance strategies.
By way of conclusion perhaps three further points could be made.
First, what this paper highlights is the way a sensitive bringing together of different and seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives is possible and can prove highly effective. As Oliver (1991) has so ably indicated institutional theory fails to be aware of or accept a theory of organisational resistance. Her own work is a start towards opening up this agenda but both her views, as well as those of Scott (1995) , have little in the way of theoretical or empirical insights into processes of organisational change either to support Oliver's contention or remove Scott's scepticism. What this paper has done is provide some important theoretical developments and empirical insights which can use institutional theory to amplify the details but also, in the process, develop its theoretical core. What institutional theorists have failed to do is look at the points where the normative, regulative and cognitive institutional contexts come together and are in conflict.
It is at these points that organisational resistance is apparent, particularly where the normative context which gives meaning to organisational values and activities, is under threat from regulative or cognitive institutional environmental contexts. Not only is this hopefully a contribution to institutional theory, as
such, but it also shows the power of empirical insights to be not only informed by theory but also inform it as well -a power which comes from the 'middle range' thinking (Laughlin, 1995) we have adopted in this paper. What this also reminds us of is the point that just as institutional theory can and should adapt to other theoretical and empirical models, so too should Habermas's thinking as well. As this paper makes plain institutional theory can provide an important amplification of some of Habermas' thinking. In the UK, however, this is conditional on how commissioning turns into Primary Care Groups or Primary Care Trusts.
In paragraph 5.4 of the 1997 White Paper (The New NHS) the view is expressed that '…the new GP commissioning pilots will extend the range of opportunities. The Government's plans go with the grain of these developments'. In paragraph 10.1 continuing the same theme the claim is that proposed changes go '….with the grain of the NHS and its traditional values'. Whether this is true and even if true whether distance does create dissonance from grass root support can only be judged over time.
Second, in terms of reflections on the workings of IPAs and commissioning groups there is always a chance that the original purposes might be lost sight of and they might become colonising forces on the originators (the GP practices) as their interactions and agendas change over time. The dangers with any satellite organisations, which are intended to interact with perceived 'alien' forces, is that they will become colonised and captured by the latter's concerns and values and take on the influencing agenda for which they were created to provide protection against. Part of the reason for this is the lack of control and accountability requirements that GP practices are in a position to exercise over their satellite organisationsthis runs into all the problems of control noted in complex 'embedded organisations' (cf. Grabner, 1993; Berry, 1995) . In the empirical examples we have looked at in this paper these difficulties have not emerged.
However, with the move by Nottingham Non-Fundholders into a joint purchasing arrangement with the District Health Authority and Pegasus moving into exercising control over laboratory tests and drug budgets a shift in emphasis from protector to coloniser is not beyond the bounds of possibility.
Third, the empirical details discussed in this paper suggest again the urgent need for some form of evaluation of these accounting and finance-led changes which are occurring world-wide (cf. Laughlin and Broadbent, 1996a; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997) . This needs to be undertaken both generally as well as specifically in the context of particular areas, both nationally and internationally. What is clear from the evidence discussed in this paper is that there is a considerable potential wasted effort both in GP practices as well as at Government (State) levels. In New Zealand and in the UK there is much activity at the State level in terms of trying to exercise control, through accounting and financial methods, over the behaviour of GP practices. At the same time there is either internal or external absorption processes and practices occurring in both countries to try to avoid this influence and so protect core normative values and neuter the changes. From a dispassionate societal viewpoint such a position appears to be a huge waste of energy crying out for some body to exercise a careful evaluation of the merit and worth of the Government changes as well as whether the GP practices' response and the creation of satellite organisations devoted to deliberate resistance is therefore necessary. If this does not occur then organisational dynamics will continue and more especially organisation resistance seems inevitable where important normative value systems are under threat by regulative or cognitive forces. This can be avoided by introducing changes which really go with the 'grain of traditional values'. Whether this grand claim, as is being made in the UK, is a reality is something only a careful evaluation can answer.
